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Comparing Children to the Mentally Retarded: How the
Decision in Atkins v. Virginia Will Affect the Execution
of Juvenile Offenders
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 6, 1989, the United States Supreme Court announced two
important death penalty decisions. One, Penry v. Lynaugh, explicitly
allowed the continued execution of mentally retarded offenders,1 and the
other, Stanford v. Kentucky, allowed the execution of juvenile offenders
age sixteen and over.2 Thirteen years later, on June 20, 2002, the Court in
Atkins v. Virginia3 overturned its decision in Penry v. Lynaugh.4 In a six
to three decision, it held that the Eighth Amendment5 prohibited the
continued execution of the mentally retarded because such action
constituted “cruel and unusual” punishment. This decision furthers the
Court’s enduring trend of whittling down possible death penalty
candidates and procedures. More importantly, a close examination of the
majority opinion reveals several significant reversals of reasoning from
similar recent cases. These reversals could have far-reaching effects on
the death penalty itself and could soon lead to the exclusion of all
juveniles from death penalty eligibility.
This Note will examine the changing face of U.S. Supreme Court
decisions on the death penalty, with a particular focus on how those
decisions have affected and will potentially affect juvenile death
penalties. Part II will explore the many cases that have led up to Atkins,
focusing on the purported reasoning behind the Court’s decisions and its
effect on the death penalty as a whole. Throughout this Note, particular
attention will be given to the favorite reasoning of individual justices in
an attempt to discern a predictable pattern. Part III focuses on the opinion
in Atkins itself, emphasizing the detection of differences from the Court’s
earlier cases. Part IV focuses on what has happened in the short time
since the Court’s decision, concluding that the Court could very soon be

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

492 U.S. 302 (1989).
Id. at 361.
536 U.S. 304 (2002).
492 U.S. at 302.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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ripe to outlaw the execution of juvenile offenders. Part IV also examines
the ramifications of that possibility. Part V offers a brief conclusion.
II. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASE HISTORY
Though most of the cases discussed in this section have little to do
with the execution of either juvenile offenders or the mentally retarded,
they are discussed in order to provide the reader with a brief history of
the death penalty over the past three decades. Specific attention is given
to the Court’s reasoning in an attempt to illustrate the trend of the Court
when determining what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. For
this reason, very little attention will be paid to the unnecessary facts of
the individual cases or to additional issues brought up on appeal that
have no bearing on the Court’s determination of the Eighth Amendment
issue.
A. Defining “Cruel and Unusual”
“It has been assumed in [Supreme Court] decisions that punishment
by death is not cruel, unless the manner of execution can be said to be
inhuman and barbarous.”6 As the Court explained in Weems v. United
States, however, “[t]ime works changes, brings into existence new
conditions and purposes,” and to serve our developing country, the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment “must be capable of
wider application than the mischief which gave it birth.”7 Though the
defendant in Weems was not in danger of execution, the Court
nevertheless undertook an extensive analysis of the meaning of “cruel
and unusual” punishment. Eventually, it held that fifteen years hard labor
along with the loss of many civil liberties constituted cruel and unusual
punishment when applied to the crime of falsifying public and official
documents.8 Ever since this 1910 decision, the definition of “cruel and
unusual” took on vast importance in deciding criminal cases. Predicting
potential changes in the definition, the Weems Court went on to say that
the clause is “progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete but may
acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane
justice.”9 This concept became the foundation of Eighth Amendment
analysis and, forty-eight years later, the Court clarified it in Trop v.
Dulles.10 Finding that it was cruel and unusual to strip Trop of his

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 241 (1972).
217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
See id. at 357-82.
Id. at 378.
356 U.S. 86 (1958).
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citizenship for maritime desertion, the Court explained that “[t]he
[Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”11
B. The Death and Rebirth of the Death Penalty
In 1972, the Court began in earnest to change the operation of the
death penalty under this “cruel and unusual” punishment framework.
That year the Court decided Furman v. Georgia and placed a moratorium
on the death penalty which would continue for five years.12 Finding that
the Georgia death penalty statute was applied unfairly against minority
groups, the Court declared such application in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments.13 The Court explained that, though it could not
ultimately determine whether the three defendants on appeal were
sentenced to death because they were black, it was more concerned with
“a system of law and of justice that leaves to the uncontrolled discretion
of judges or juries the determination whether defendants committing
these crimes should die or be imprisoned.”14 It was troubled by the fact
that “[p]eople live or die, dependent on the whim of one man or of
[twelve].”15 The Court, therefore, banned the death penalty until such
time as the states could determine a more equal system of justice. Justice
Rehnquist, the only current member of the Court who was also on the
Court in 1972, joined Chief Justice Burger’s dissent, which
fundamentally disagreed that the sentence of death was “unusual” when
it had been practiced for so many years.16
In the four years immediately following Furman, “at least 35
States . . . enacted new statutes that provide for the death penalty for at
least some crimes that result in the death of another person.”17
Examining another Georgia death penalty case in 1976, the Court,
including Justices Rehnquist and Stevens, explained that
[t]hese recently adopted statutes have attempted to address the concerns
expressed by the Court in Furman primarily (i) by specifying the
factors to be weighed and the procedures to be followed in deciding
when to impose a capital sentence, or (ii) by making the death penalty
mandatory for specified crimes. But all of the post-Furman statutes

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 101 (emphasis added).
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
See id.
Id. at 253.
Id.
Id. at 379.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 (1976).
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make clear that capital punishment itself has not been rejected by the
elected representatives of the people.18

It was here that the Court first evidenced a tendency that would continue
throughout modern death penalty analysis: it determined the “evolving
standards of decency” by reference to state legislatures and jury
verdicts.19 While reinstating the death penalty, the Gregg Court also
acknowledged that, under current standards of decency, retribution
against the offender was a proper use for the death penalty, for “certain
crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only
adequate response may be the penalty of death.”20 The following year,
the moratorium ended as 1977 witnessed the first state execution in
almost ten years.21
C. Using the Evolving Standards Analysis to Exclude Groups of
Offenders
1. The Justices take sides
In 1977, the Supreme Court began using the “evolving standards of
decency” analysis to exclude entire categories of people and crimes from
the reach of the death penalty. In the space of nine years, the Court
excluded those who rape adult women,22 non-violent accomplices of
those who murder during the commission of a felony,23 and the legally
insane.24 In each case, the Court examined several indicators of the
18. Id. at 180-81.
19. See id.
20. Id. at 184.
21. This first execution, by firing squad, was carried out in Utah on Gary Mark Gilmore on
January 17, 1977. The previous year, only 17 days after Gregg was decided, Gilmore killed two
victims during petty burglaries on adjacent days. His crimes occurred in Orem and Provo, Utah, not
far from the campus of Brigham Young University, the host of this Journal. The speed of his
execution was due, in part, to his waiver of appeals. Gary Mark Gilmore, U.S. Executions Since
1976, Clark County Indiana Prosecutor, at http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/death/US/
gilmore001.htm. His mother filed an application for stay of execution with the U.S. Supreme Court,
which granted a temporary stay. Gilmore soon afterwards filed a response, challenging his mother’s
right to act as “next friend” and indicating his eagerness that the sentence be carried out. The Court
terminated his stay December 13, 1976. Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976). His final words
were “Let’s do it.” Gary Mark Gilmore, U.S. Executions Since 1976, Clark County Indiana
Prosecutor, at http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/death/US/gilmore001.htm.
22. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
23. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
24. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). The prohibition against executing the
insane extends not only to those who were insane when they committed the murder, but also to those
who become insane prior to their execution date. See id. at 429 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the
result in part and dissenting in part). The test is “whether the condemned man was aware of his
conviction and the nature of his impending fate.” Id. at 422 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
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modern “standard of decency,” particularly state statutes and the
decisions of sentencing juries.
In each of these three landmark decisions, Justice Stevens, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, and, for the last two decisions, Justice O’Connor25
each voted essentially the same way each time. Chief Justice Rehnquist
established himself as an advocate of the death penalty. Justice Stevens
has unfailingly supported whichever side wanted to abolish part of the
death penalty. Justice O’Connor has frequently supported the death
penalty—though most often for different reasons than the Chief Justice.
Through these first three exclusionary cases, distinct patterns started
to develop. Justice Stevens, joining the majority or plurality vote each
time, was quick to determine from legislative enactments, sentencing
jury verdicts, and other sources (such as his own judgment)26 that current
standards of decency would preclude the imposition of the death penalty
in each case. Conversely, Chief Justice Rehnquist either joined or wrote
the dissent each time, strongly preferring to examine only state statutes
and sentencing jury verdicts.27 In each opinion, he focused more on the
societal desire for justice in punishment than on which idea might hold
the moral “high road.”28 Justice O’Connor, however, did not seem
concerned with what was morally best or with what was best for
society’s interests in punishment but focused instead on the more
traditionally legal arguments. Though she voted most consistently in
favor of the death penalty, she normally voiced her own reasons for

25. Since a major purpose of this Note is to analyze the possible analysis of the current
Court, only the current Justices’ rulings will be evaluated.
26. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 597 (“These recent events evidencing the attitude of state
legislatures and sentencing juries do not wholly determine this controversy, for the Constitution
contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the
acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment.”); see also Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797
(“Although the judgments of legislatures, juries, and prosecutors weigh heavily in the balance, it is
for us ultimately to judge whether the Eighth Amendment permits imposition of the death penalty on
one such as Enmund.”).
27. It should be pointed out, however, that Chief Justice Rehnquist did join Justice
O’Connor’s dissent in Enmund, which contained an analysis of whether the death penalty was a
proportionate punishment for Enmund’s crimes (and concluded that it was, where evidence showed
that he had planned the robbery that resulted in the deaths of the two victims). See Enmund, 458 U.S.
at 816 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“In sum, in considering the petitioner’s challenge, the Court
should decide not only whether the petitioner’s sentence of death offends contemporary standards as
reflected in the responses of legislatures and juries, but also whether it is disproportionate to the
harm that the petitioner caused and to the petitioner’s involvement in the crime.”).
28. See, i.e. id. at 606 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). After recounting the facts of the case
wherein it is revealed that Coker is already serving life sentences for previous rapes—he escaped
from prison to perform the rape at issue in the case—he pointed out that “the Court’s holding assures
that petitioner—as well as others in his position—will henceforth feel no compunction whatsoever
about committing further rapes as frequently as he may be able to escape from confinement and
indeed even within the walls of the prison itself.” Id.
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doing so.29 These various differences carried through in the cases that
sought to abolish juvenile death penalties and the execution of the
mentally retarded.
2. Thompson v. Oklahoma
Within two years after Ford v. Wainwright outlawed the execution of
the mentally insane, Justices Scalia and Kennedy had joined the Court.
That year, in Thompson v. Oklahoma,30 the Court extended the death
penalty prohibition to include offenders who were under sixteen at the
time of their offense. Once again, the Justices divided along predictable
lines: four Justices (including Justice Stevens) joined the plurality,
Justice O’Connor concurred in the result, and three Justices (including
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia) dissented.31
In Thompson, the defendant appealed his conviction for the brutal
murder of his former brother-in-law, performed in retaliation for the
victim’s abuse of his older sister.32 At the time of the murder, the
defendant was only fifteen years old. He had acted in concert with three
of his older friends,33 and all four were eventually sentenced to death.34
a. The plurality opinion. Writing for the plurality, Justice Stevens
examined relevant legislative enactments and jury determinations and
“explain[ed] why these indicators of contemporary standards of decency
confirm [the plurality’s] judgment that such a young person is not
capable of acting with the degree of culpability that can justify the
ultimate penalty.”35 In defining cruel and unusual punishment, the
plurality emphasized that “whether an action is ‘unusual’ depends . . .

29. See, e.g. Ford, 477 U.S. at 430-31 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the result in part and
dissenting in part) (“In my view . . . the only federal question presented in cases such as this is
whether the State’s positive law has created a liberty interest and whether its procedures are
adequate to protect that interest from arbitrary deprivation. Once satisfied that the procedures were
adequate, a federal court has no authority to second-guess a State’s substantive competency
determination.”). Additionally, Justice O’Connor showed an early fondness for invoking a
proportionality analysis—designed, simply, to determine whether the punishment fit the crime as
well as the personal culpability of each defendant. This becomes significant in cases where her
opinions conflict with that of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, who criticize the use of
proportionality analysis as irrelevant and self-serving. See, i.e., infra note 69 and accompanying text.
30. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
31. Justice Stevens wrote the plurality opinion, Justice O’Connor wrote the concurrence, and
Justice Scalia wrote the dissent. Justice Kennedy, new to the Court, took no part in the decision. See,
generally, id.
32. Id. at 860 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 819.
35. Id. at 822-23 (footnotes omitted).
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upon the frequency of its occurrence or the magnitude of its
acceptance.”36
Instead of delving immediately into the frequency or acceptance of
the death penalty as applied to juveniles under sixteen, the plurality first
emphasized the legal ways in which children differ from adults.37 The
plurality then concluded that society assumes that the average juvenile
“is not quite ready to take on the fully rational and considered task of
shaping his or her own life.”38 According to the plurality, these basic
assumptions lead to the conclusion that “it is likely cruel, and certainly
unusual, to impose on a child a punishment that takes as its predicate the
existence of a fully rational, choosing agent, who may be deterred by the
harshest of sanctions and toward whom society may legitimately take a
retributive stance.”39
With this basic analysis in place, the plurality then continued with its
analysis of the current standard of decency by playing the ever popular
numbers game. At the outset, it excluded any state in which the death
penalty has been completely prohibited, along with the nineteen states
which had not declared any minimum age for capital punishment
eligibility “because they do not focus on the question of where the
chronological age line should be drawn.”40 Out of the remaining eighteen
states, the plurality noted that “all of them require that the defendant
have attained at least the age of sixteen at the time of the capital
offense.”41 Thus, with the backing of eighteen states,42 the plurality
found that the national consensus forbade the execution of children who
were under sixteen at the time their crime was committed.43
The plurality next looked to the opinions of professional
organizations and the laws of other nations for guidance, ultimately
deducing that their decision was “consistent with the views that have
36. Id. at 822 n.7.
37. Id. at 825 n.23. (Citing juveniles’ eligibility limitations on the right to vote, hold office,
marry without parental consent, and ability to purchase alcohol, cigarettes, or pornographic
materials).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 829. In later cases, however, Justice Stevens and others do count those states which
do not have a death penalty as states wherein certain defendants, technically, could not be executed.
See discussion infra Parts II.D-III.
41. Id.
42. Apparently, the only states that turned up for the polls were those who had specifically
dealt with such youthful offenders in their statutes.
43. In response to the math of the dissent, the plurality also points out that if you were to
count the nineteen states that technically allow the execution of fifteen-year-old offenders as votes
against the result here, there are still thirty-two states where such an execution would be
impermissible—either because the state had banned the death penalty entirely or because they had
specifically disallowed executing juvenile offenders of fifteen and under. Id. at 829 n.29.
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been expressed by respected professional organizations, by other nations
that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading members of
the Western European community.”44 Turning then to jury results, the
plurality estimated that between eighteen and twenty juvenile offenders
who were under the age of sixteen at the time of their offense had been
executed during the twentieth century—the last execution occurring in
1948.45 Each piece of evidence compiled by the plurality supports the
idea that, according to professional organizations, other nations, and
American juries, the current standard of decency forbids the execution of
fifteen-year-old offenders.
Finally, the plurality consulted its own judgment on the questions of
“whether the juvenile’s culpability should be measured by the same
standard as that of an adult, and . . . whether the application of the death
penalty to this class of offenders measurably contributes to the social
purposes that are served by the death penalty.”46 Examining each
element, the plurality relied upon various studies that examine the
psychological differences between juveniles and adults.47 Finding that
teens are less culpable than adults, the plurality explained that
[i]nexperience, less education, and less intelligence make the teenager
less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct while at the
same time he or she is much more apt to be motivated by mere emotion
or peer pressure than is an adult. The reasons why juveniles are not
trusted with the privileges and responsibilities of an adult also explain
why their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that
of an adult.48

As to the question of whether administering the death penalty to
fifteen-year-old offenders serves the dual purposes of the death penalty,49
the plurality held that not only is retribution “inapplicable to the
execution of a 15-year-old offender,” but that “the deterrence rationale is
equally unacceptable.”50 Ultimately, the plurality declared the execution
of fifteen-year-old offenders to be fundamentally unconstitutional in light

44. Id. at 830.
45. See id. at 832.
46. Id. at 833 (quotations omitted).
47. See id. at 835.
48. Id.
49. Retribution and deterrence are the dual purposes of the death penalty. See id. at 837.
50. Id. Specifically, the plurality reasoned that “[t]he likelihood that the teenage offender has
made the kind of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any weight to the possibility of execution is so
remote as to be virtually nonexistent. And, even if one posits such a cold-blooded calculation by a
15-year-old, it is fanciful to believe that he would be deterred by the knowledge that a small number
of persons his age have been executed during the 20th century.” Id. at 837-38.
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of the evolving standards of morality that determined what was currently
cruel and unusual.
b. O’Connor’s concurrence. Concurring in the decision to reverse but
calling the judgment of the plurality too broad, Justice O’Connor
provided an alternative analysis—complete with a unique result.51
Concluding that “a national consensus forbidding the execution of any
person for a crime committed before the age of 16 very likely does
exist,” she was still “reluctant to adopt this conclusion as a matter of
constitutional law without better evidence than we now possess.”52
Declaring that the plurality’s reliance on bare conviction records is
misleading, she asserted that, without more detailed statistics, the records
do not truly reflect a greater reluctance of juries to pass the sentence of
death upon fifteen-year-old offenders than upon their adult
counterparts.53 She also admitted that the legal effect of the statutes of
the nineteen states that do not specifically forbid the execution of fifteen
year old offenders could stand as an obstacle to concluding that a
national consensus exists.54 Additionally, though she granted the idea
“that adolescents are generally less blameworthy than adults who commit
similar crimes,” she could not agree that “all 15- year-olds are incapable
of the moral culpability that would justify the imposition of capital
punishment.”55 Nor did she agree with the plurality “that 15-year-olds as
a class are inherently incapable of being deterred from major crimes by
the prospect of the death penalty.”56 She would rather have left that
decision up to the elected officials.57
Nevertheless, Justice O’Connor concurred in the result because of
the good possibility that there was a national consensus on the matter.
Rather than completely ban the executions of fifteen-year-old offenders,
however, she proposed that such executions be banned only in those
states where the legislatures have not specifically set a minimum age.58
Countering the dissent’s attack on this plan, she qualified it by reasoning
that “[i]n this case, there is significant affirmative evidence of a national
consensus forbidding the execution of defendants who were below the

51. See id. at 848-59.
52. Id. at 848-49.
53. Specifically, Justice O’Connor cites the plurality’s failure to provide statistics on how
many fifteen-year-olds were legally eligible for the death penalty and did not receive it due to
prosecutorial discretion or jury decisions. See id. at 853.
54. See id. at 852.
55. Id. at 853.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 854.
58. See id. at 857-58.
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age of 16 at the time of the offense,”59 and she was worried that the
legislatures which had not specified a minimum age for capital
punishment could be surprised when simply certifying a fifteen-year-old
as an adult also rendered him or her eligible for the death penalty.60
c. Scalia’s dissent. In his dissent, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice Scalia focused more on the process that was used to certify
Thompson to be tried as an adult in the first place.61 Citing the
psychologist’s recommendation that the juvenile justice system could not
help him,62 the dissent pointed out that his transfer to the adult system
was correct and that the jury’s decision to execute was made after the
defense was allowed to argue his youthfulness as a mitigating factor.63
Examining the statutes that allow for juveniles to be transferred to the
adult system, the dissent pointed out that the age of transfer was being
lowered nationwide instead of raised and that, once in the adult system,
they could constitutionally be punished as adults.64
The dissent also had its own way of counting the votes; like the
plurality, it excluded from the count any state that did not allow the death
penalty (reasoning that the issue did not exist for them) but included in
the count in favor of executing fifteen-year-old offenders the nineteen
states that “have determined that no minimum age for capital punishment
is appropriate.”65 According to the dissent, therefore, the majority of the
states “for whom the issue exists . . . are of the view that death is not
different insofar as the age of juvenile criminal responsibility is
concerned.”66 Counting the jury verdicts differently as well, the dissent
pointed out that, though they had not been executed yet, five defendants
in five different states all under the age of fifteen were sentenced to
death between 1984 and 1986.67
Responding to the other aspects of the plurality’s opinion, the dissent
attacked all reasoning which departed from a strict analysis of state
59. Id. at 858 n.*.
60. Specifically, she was worried that Oklahoma and other states like it had not “give[n] the
question the serious consideration that would have been reflected in the explicit choice of some
minimum age for death eligibility.” Id. at 857.
61. Id. at 861-62 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
62. See id. Her testimony included an estimation that “Thompson understood the difference
between right and wrong but had an antisocial personality that could not be modified by the juvenile
justice system.” Id. at 862. She further testified that “Thompson believed that because of his age he
was beyond any severe penalty of the law, and accordingly did not believe there would be any severe
repercussions from his behavior.” Id.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 865. The dissent seems to assume that whatever result came from the statute
must have been intended by the state legislature.
65. Id. at 867-68.
66. Id. at 868.
67. See id. at 869.
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statutes and jury verdicts, claiming that the “societal consensus
discernible in legislation . . . is assuredly all that is relevant.”68 Though it
concedes that the Supreme Court must ultimately judge what is
constitutional, the dissent argues that their judgments must be confined
to deciding what was originally forbidden or must conform to the
“national society[‘s]” idea of the evolving standard of decency.69
The dissent focused on the enactments of the state legislatures and,
in part, on the verdicts of sentencing juries to determine the evolving
standard of decency. All other sources of analysis, it believed, were
inappropriate to decide the question.
D. The Tide Turns: The Court Declines to Exclude Further Groups
The year after Thompson, on June 6, 1989, the Supreme Court
released two decisions. Both decisions refused to exclude the latest group
of hopefuls from death penalty eligibility.70 In each case, the issues are
similar, the relevant evidence is gleaned from similar sources, and most
of the Justices vote essentially the same as they did in Thompson. This
time, however, Justices O’Connor and Kennedy tipped the balance of the
Court so that Justices Rehnquist and Scalia came out in the majority.
1. Stanford v. Kentucky: executing sixteen- and seventeen-year-old
offenders
In Stanford v. Kentucky, Kevin Stanford and Heath Wilkins sought to
abolish the death penalty entirely for juvenile offenders by extending the
prohibition to include those who committed crimes “at 16 or 17 years of
age.”71 The two defendants listed in the appeal, Stanford and Wilkins,
were each convicted of various crimes committed while they were

68. Id. at 868. The dissent particularly dislikes the idea that other countries could possibly
have a say in what United States morals ought to be, arguing “[t]hat 40% of our States do not rule
out capital punishment for 15-year-old felons is determinative of the question before us here, even if
that position contradicts the uniform view of the rest of the world.” Id. at 868 n.4.
69. See id. at 873. The dissent goes on to say that something is not unconstitutional because it
is “out of accord with the perceptions of decency, or of penology, or of mercy, entertained—or
strongly entertained, or even held as an ‘abiding conviction’—by a majority of the small and
unrepresentative segment of our society that sits on this Court.” Id. Along with its attack on the
judgment of the plurality, the dissent also criticizes its analysis of the importance of the legal
differences between juveniles and adults, concluding that “[i]t is surely constitutional for a State to
believe that the degree of maturity that is necessary fully to appreciate the pros and cons of smoking
cigarettes, or even of marrying, may be somewhat greater than the degree necessary fully to
appreciate the pros and cons of brutally killing a human being.” Id. at 871 n.5.
70. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
Stanford is discussed first, though it follows Penry in the reporter.
71. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 364-65.
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seventeen and sixteen, respectively. Both were sentenced to death.72 On
appeal, the two defendants each claimed that executing those who were
under eighteen at the time of their offense constituted cruel and unusual
punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.73 As in Thompson, the
Justices voted along predictable lines and used the same analysis to
support their positions.
a. Scalia’s plurality opinion. Joined by the Chief Justice and Justice
Kennedy, Justice Scalia repeated each of the arguments he used in his
Thompson dissent. He rejected outright any idea that other nations or the
Justices’ own conceptions of decency had any relevance on the
question.74 As in Thompson, he discounted the relevance of other legal
age limits75 along with the conclusions of opinion polls, interest groups,
and professional associations.76 Likewise refusing to perform a
proportionality analysis77 (which would only help to determine the
Justice’s own conceptions of decency), he scoffed at the dissent’s
reliance on “socioscientific” evidence to support their conclusion that the
death penalty is inappropriate for sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds.78
Concluding, therefore, that the votes of state legislatures and jury
verdicts are the only relevant evidence for analysis, Justice Scalia, as in
Thompson, again counted only “the 37 States whose laws permit capital
punishment.”79 Finding that only twelve (32%) of the states declined to

72. See id. at 365-67 (Stanford kidnapped his neighbor from the gas station where she
worked, robbed the store, raped her, sodomized her, then shot her in the face because she knew him
and could recognize him. Wilkins, after a long history of juvenile offenses, repeatedly stabbed a
mother of two who was working behind the counter of the store he robbed.).
73. Id. at 368 (“Wilkins would have us define juveniles as individuals 16 years of age and
under; Stanford would draw the line at 17.”).
74. See id. at 369-71; see also id. at 379 (To say that the Justices must ultimately judge the
issue “is to replace judges of the law with a committee of philosopher-kings.”).
75. Id. at 374-75 (“These laws set the appropriate ages for the operation of a system that
makes its determinations in gross, and that does not conduct individualized maturity tests for each
driver, drinker, or voter. The criminal justice system, however, does provide individualized
testing . . . . and one of the individualized mitigating factors that sentencers must be permitted to
consider is the defendant’s age.”).
76. Id. at 377 (“A revised national consensus so broad, so clear, and so enduring as to justify
a permanent prohibition upon all units of democratic government must appear in the operative acts
(laws and the application of laws) that the people have approved.”).
77. Proportionality examines whether the punishment fits the crime as well as the defendant’s
personal culpability.
78. The “socioscientific” evidence he referred to purported to show that sixteen- and
seventeen-year-olds have less developed cognitive skills, are less mature and responsible, and do not
fear death, and are therefore not only less morally blameworthy but are also less likely to consider
the possibility of a death sentence before killing. See id. at 377-78 (basing his determination of
irrelevance on the idea that, until it can be shown that no sixteen- or seventeen-year-old is culpable
or deterred, the death penalty should not be banned for all).
79. Id. at 370.
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impose capital punishment on offenders under eighteen80 and that an
additional three states (for a total of fifteen or 40.5%) refused to impose
it on offenders under the age of seventeen,81 Justice Scalia concluded that
“[t]his does not establish the degree of national consensus this Court has
previously thought sufficient to label a particular punishment cruel and
unusual.”82 Summarizing the previous rulings of the Court, he pointed
out the following facts: (1) the death penalty was struck down as a
punishment for rape because “Georgia was the sole jurisdiction that
authorized such a punishment,”83 (2) capital punishment for a nonviolent accomplice was struck down because only eight states authorized
it, and (3) the insane were excluded from capital punishment because no
state permitted it.84 With only 40.5% of states banning the execution of
sixteen-year-old offenders and only 32% of states banning the execution
of seventeen-year-old offenders, Justice Scalia (and, with him, the
plurality) found insufficient statutory evidence of a national consensus
against the juvenile death penalty.85
Examining briefly the evidence of jury verdicts, Justice Scalia found
it of little significance that few juvenile offenders were sentenced to
death, that they accounted for only 2% of executions between 1642 and
1986, or that “the last execution of a person who committed a crime
under 17 years of age occurred in 1959.”86 Explaining that any
discrepancy can be easily understood by the fact that a far smaller
percentage of capital crimes are committed by juveniles, he went on to
say that even if “a substantial discrepancy exists, that does not establish
the requisite proposition that the death sentence for offenders under 18 is
categorically unacceptable to prosecutors and juries.”87 Until all or most
juries find such a sentence to be “categorically unacceptable,” he argued,
they should be left with the possibility of imposing it after consideration
of the individual offender.88

80. These states included California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, and Tennessee. Id. at 370 n.2.
81. These three states were Georgia, North Carolina, and Texas. Id.
82. Id. at 370-71. Unmentioned in his analysis are the nineteen states he counted in
Thompson which set no minimum age limit. By examining his analysis, however, it is clear he
counts them among those states that do not ban the death penalty for juvenile offenders.
83. Id. at 371; see also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 95-96 (1977).
84. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 371.
85. He specifically points out that it is the burden of the petitioners to establish a national
consensus against the juvenile death penalty, and not the burden of the states to establish a
consensus for it. See id. at 373.
86. See id. 373-74.
87. Id. at 374.
88. Id.
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b. O’Connor’s concurrence: championing the proportionality analysis.
Though Justice O’Connor appeared to agree with the plurality’s vote
counting,89 she did not agree with the estimation that a proportionality
analysis was improper.90 She felt, as she expressed in Thompson, that
“age-based statutory classifications” were relevant to the analysis.91 She
specifically stated that, “[i]n [her] view, this Court does have a
constitutional obligation to conduct proportionality analysis,” even
though she felt that these cases could not be resolved through it.92
She did not, however, take the time to explain how proportionality
evidence should be weighted when deciding the evolving standard of
decency. She declared that “although I do not believe that these
particular cases can be resolved through proportionality analysis, I reject
the suggestion that the use of such analysis is improper as a matter of
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.”93 More helpful, perhaps, would have
been an explanation about how proportionality would affect the analysis
in another case where, in her opinion, it could help resolve the issue. The
tenor of her opinion almost suggests that, though there was clearly no
evidence of a national consensus in 1989, proportionality may be used to
tip the balance when the counted votes of the state statutes fall closer
together.94
c. Dissent: different numbers and proportionality. Written by the late
Justice Brennan and joined by three members of the Court, including
Justice Stevens, the dissent brought all the evidence examined by the
Thompson plurality to bear in concluding that, like the execution of
offenders under the age of fifteen, executing sixteen- and seventeen-yearold offenders is cruel and unusual punishment.95 Counting the votes
differently,96 the dissent included not only those fifteen states which
exclude the execution of sixteen- and/or seventeen-year-olds, but also
those states which do not authorize capital punishment at all. With those
numbers, the dissent concluded that “it appears that the governments in
fully 27 of the States have concluded that no one under 18 should face
89. She finds that “it is sufficiently clear that no national consensus forbids the imposition of
capital punishment on 16- or 17-year-old capital murderers.” Id. at 381.
90. She does not, however, engage in proportionality analysis herself in this case. See id. at
382.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 382.
94. Id. at 380-382.
95. See id. at 383-405 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
96. Not only does the dissent count them differently from the plurality, but it also counts
them differently from Thompson’s plurality: Stanford’s dissent included outright the states which
have outlawed the death penalty entirely, while Thompson’s plurality only pointed them out as a
reaction to the numbers of the dissent. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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the death penalty” and that “a total of 30 States . . . would not tolerate the
execution of petitioner Wilkins.”97 The dissent’s numbers demonstrate
that 53% of the states (including the District of Columbia)98 would not
execute Stanford and 59% would not execute Wilkins. The dissent also
mentioned that South Dakota should be counted as well, since it had not
sentenced anyone to death since Furman was decided thirteen years
before,99 and it excluded the other eighteen of the nineteen states which
had not set a minimum age and, therefore, had not considered the
question.100
Concerning the other evidence of a national standard, the dissent was
considerably more liberal than the plurality, considering not only jury
verdicts,101 but the very “ethicoscientific” evidence102 scoffed at by the
plurality, the views of professional organizations103 and other nations.104
The court also engaged in the proportionality analysis championed by
Justice O’Connor. Not surprisingly, they found that jury verdicts
imposing the death penalty on juveniles were rare, consisting of only
2.3% of all death sentences imposed during 1982-1988.105 In their
proportionality analysis, the dissent focused on ethicoscientific evidence
indicating that juveniles do not function at an adult level of culpability106
97. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 384.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 384 n.1. Though South Dakota still has not executed anyone, they do have five
inmates currently on death row, indicating that the dissent would have been including them
prematurely among the list of states that had abandoned the death penalty. South Dakota does not,
however, have any juveniles on death row, though they do not specify any minimum age in their
law. See Death Row U.S.A. Winter 2003, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.,
available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/DEATHROWUSArecent.pdf.
100. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 385.
101. Importantly, the dissent points out that most capital sentencing juries exclude those “who
oppose capital punishment—a fact that renders capital jury sentences a distinctly weighted measure
of contemporary standards.” Id. at 387 n.3 (citation omitted).
102. Id. at 383.
103. “Where organizations with expertise in a relevant area have given careful consideration
to the question of a punishment’s appropriateness, there is no reason why that judgment should not
be entitled to attention as an indicator of contemporary standards. There is no dearth of opinion from
such groups that the state-sanctioned killing of minors is unjustified.” Id. at 388.
104. “Our cases recognize that objective indicators of contemporary standards of decency in
the form of legislation in other countries is also of relevance to Eighth Amendment analysis. Many
countries, of course—over 50, including nearly all in Western Europe—have formally abolished the
death penalty, or have limited its use to exceptional crimes such as treason . . . Twenty-seven others
do not in practice impose the penalty. Of the nations that retain capital punishment, a majority—
65—prohibit the execution of juveniles.” Id. at 389 (citations omitted).
105. Id. at 387. The Court also points out that, though 1.8% of arrested adults are sentenced to
death, only .5% of arrested juveniles are. Id.
106. Id. at 395 (“Adolescents ‘are more vulnerable, more impulsive, and less self-disciplined
than adults,’ and are without the same ‘capacity to control their conduct and to think in long-range
terms.’” (quoting Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Sentencing Policy Toward Young
Offenders, Confronting Youth Crime 7 (1978).). “They are particularly impressionable and subject
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and concluded from this that the dual punishment purposes of retribution
and deterrence could not be served: retribution could not be served
because it is useless to take retribution on someone who is not culpable,
and deterrence could not be served because juveniles do not think about
the possibility of execution before they act.107 Specifically rebutting the
idea that only those juveniles who actually do function at the adult level
of thinking are executed (because defendants are sorted out and
individually considered during the criminal process), the dissent pointed
out that:
A jury is free to weigh a juvenile offender’s youth and lack of full
responsibility against the heinousness of the crime and other
aggravating factors—and, finding the aggravating factors weightier, to
sentence even the most immature of 16- or 17-year olds to be killed. By
no stretch of the imagination, then, are the transfer and sentencing
decisions designed to isolate those juvenile offenders who are
exceptionally mature and responsible, and who thus stand out from
their peers as a class. It is thus unsurprising that individualized
consideration at transfer and sentencing has not in fact ensured that
juvenile offenders lacking an adult’s culpability are not sentenced to
die. Quite the contrary. Adolescents on death row appear typically to
have a battery of psychological, emotional, and other problems going to
108
their likely capacity for judgment and level of blameworthiness.

Along this line, the dissent also highlighted the psychological
profiles of both Stanford and Wilkins, each of whom had multiple
psychological and social problems. Wilkins had these problems even to
the extent that he was found incompetent to waive his right to counsel.109
By analyzing the dissent’s arguments, it seems clear that though they
held that the majority of states were against juvenile executions, their
main drive came from their proportionality analysis and the examination
of evidence deemed questionable by the majority. There is no wonder
why they were always on opposite sides of the issue.
2. Penry v. Lynaugh: addressing mentally retarded executions
The same day Stanford was announced, the Court also announced its
decision on Penry v. Lynaugh, a case in which petitioner Johnny Penry
to peer pressure, and prone to ‘experiment, risk-taking and bravado.’” Id. (quoting Task Force 3.).
“They lack ‘experience, perspective, and judgment.’” Id. (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,
635 (1979).).)
107. See id. at 404-05.
108. Id. at 397-98.
109. See id. at 401-02 (“It would be incredible to suppose, given this psychiatrist’s conclusion
and his summary of Wilkins’ past, set out in the margin, that Missouri’s transfer and sentencing
schemes had operated to identify in Wilkins a 16-year old mature and culpable beyond his years.”).
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had sought to exclude the mentally retarded from death penalty
eligibility.110 Justice O’Connor wrote the opinion of the court, in which
she was joined in only two parts by the full court.111 The rest of her
opinion was joined in two parts by Stanford’s dissent,112 in two different
parts by Stanford’s plurality, 113 and by no one for a final part.114 To
further complicate matters, there are three separate opinions concurring
in part and dissenting in part, joined at various points by each of the
other eight members of the Court. Though this opinion is structurally
quite different from Stanford’s opinion, its analytical similarities are
striking.
a. Analyzing cruel and unusual punishment.115 Examining state
legislative decisions and the actions of sentencing juries as “[t]he clearest
and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values,” the Court
engaged in the same vote-counting exercise mentioned earlier in this
Note.116 In their examination, however, the Court found that only one
state, Georgia, currently banned the execution of retarded persons and
that just one other state, Maryland, had enacted a similar statute which
would take effect later that year.117 Deciding that two state statutes did
not provide enough evidence of a national consensus on the issue, the
Court concluded that none existed.118
What is surprising is that the Justices who joined Justice O’Connor
for this Part (Part II-B) (Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens) constituted the entire dissent from Stanford. Though one would
have expected the justices from the Stanford plurality (Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia, and Kennedy) to have joined
Justice O’Connor here, they did not. A possible explanation for their
absence, however, is found in the Part’s analysis of opinion polls and the
opinions of professional organizations—evidence sources the Stanford
plurality specifically defined as irrelevant. Though the Court found that

110. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
111. Id. at 307-13, 329-30 (Parts I and IV-A, respectively: Part I describes the story and
history of the case and Part IV-A describes the Court’s decision that Penry’s holding would apply
retroactively to defendants on collateral review).
112. Id. at 314-19, 319-28 (Parts II-B and III, respectively: Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens joined Justice O’Connor in her analysis of cruel and unusual punishment and
whether the Court’s ruling constituted a “new rule” (concluding that it did not).
113. Id. at 313-14, 330-35 (Parts II-A and IV-B, respectively: Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White, Scalia, and Kennedy joined Justice O’Connor in her analysis of finality concerns and
general “new rule” retroactivity).
114. Id. at 335-40 (Part IV-C, which contains her proportionality analysis.)
115. Id. at 314-19 (Part II-B).
116. Id. at 331, 334.
117. Id. at 334.
118. Id.
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even with the polls and professional opinions there was insufficient
evidence to find a national consensus,119 their very presence in this part
of the opinion could explain the Stanford plurality’s absence. The
apparent discrepancy of the Stanford dissent voting against itself is also
explained later in the opinion: each of them wrote or joined an opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part, expressing their view that the
executions should be banned anyway.120
b. Justice O’Connor engages in an unpopular proportionality analysis.
True to her word in her Stanford concurrence, O’Connor offered a
proportionality analysis.121 In examining culpability, she reviewed the
arguments advanced by Penry and his various amici.122 They argued that
cognitive impairment, diminished moral reasoning and impulse control,
and inability to understand cause and effect combine to position the
mentally retarded below the culpability level required for capital
punishment and therefore beyond the reach of retributive purposes.123
She found, however, that “[she] cannot conclude that all mentally
retarded people of Penry’s ability—by virtue of their mental retardation
alone, and apart from any individualized consideration of their personal
responsibility—inevitably lack the cognitive, volitional, and moral
capacity to act with the degree of culpability associated with the death
penalty.”124 With that finding, and after rejecting Penry’s request that the
Court focus on his “mental age,”125 she concluded with her opinion that,
“[w]hile a national consensus against execution of the mentally retarded
may someday emerge reflecting the ‘evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society,’ there is insufficient evidence of
such a consensus today.”126
c. Brennan’s opinion (concurring in part, dissenting in part). Joined by
Justice Marshall, Justice Brennan’s own proportionality analysis yielded
the opposite result.127 Maintaining that the defects of the mentally
retarded always limit his or her culpability to the point that the death
penalty is disproportionate to blameworthiness, he would therefore find it

119. See id. at 335.
120. See infra. Part II.D.2.c-d.
121. Penry, 492 U.S. at 335-40 (Part IV-C). However, since the Stanford plurality shuns
proportionality and Stanford’s dissent dislikes her conclusions, she is alone in this part of the
opinion.
122. See, generally, id.
123. Id. at 336-37.
124. Id. at 338.
125. Specifically, she held that mental age was too hard to calculate and that there was no
finding of Penry’s mental age below. See id. at 339-40.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 341-349 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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unconstitutional.128 In an argument similar to that found in Stanford’s
dissent, he maintained that individualized consideration “fails to ensure
that [exceptionally responsible mentally retarded persons] are the only
mentally retarded offenders who will be picked out to receive a death
sentence.”129 This is because, as the Stanford dissent pointed out, “[t]he
sentencer is free to weigh a mentally retarded offender’s relative lack of
culpability against the heinousness of the crime and other aggravating
factors and to decide that even the most retarded and irresponsible of
offenders should die.”130 Justice Brennan also applied mentally retarded
persons’ lack of culpability to the goals of punishment and concluded
that neither goal is served by executing the mentally retarded.131 Because
they are not culpable, retribution is not served by executing them, and
because they can not anticipate consequences, the threat of capital
punishment will not deter them.132
d. Stevens’ opinion (concurring in part, dissenting in part). Joined by
Justice Blackmun, Justice Stevens simply stated that the execution of the
mentally retarded should be unconstitutional in light of the arguments
advanced by the American Association on Mental Retardation.133 He did
not elaborate beyond that.
e. Scalia’s opinion (concurring in part, dissenting in part). Joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Kennedy, the part of
Justice Scalia’s opinion that relates to the Eighth Amendment spoke
mainly of his disapproval of Justice O’Connor’s proportionality analysis.
Referring to his reasoning in Stanford, he maintained that “if an objective
examination of laws and jury determinations fails to demonstrate
society’s disapproval of it, the punishment is not unconstitutional even if
out of accord with the theories of penology favored by the Justices of this
Court.”134
Thus, through decades of debate and multiple changes in the Court
itself, we are left with the same two (sharply divided) branches of
analysis we started with: 1) counting the votes; and 2) performing a
proportionality analysis. One half of the Court only counts votes from
128. Id. at 346.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 347.
131. See id. at 348-49.
132. Id.
133. See id. at 350 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also id. at 33637 (“The AAMR and other groups working with the mentally retarded agree with Penry. They argue
as amici that all mentally retarded people, regardless of their degree of retardation, have substantial
cognitive and behavioral disabilities that reduce their level of blameworthiness for a capital
offense. . . . mentally retarded people cannot act with the level of moral culpability that would justify
imposition of the death sentence.” (citations omitted)).
134. Id. at 351.
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statutes; the other half also looks at polls, professional organizations, and
other nations for guidance. Similarly, one half discounts proportionality
entirely, while the other seems to prefer it even to vote counting.135
Thirteen years later, this division would play out dramatically as the
Supreme Court overturned Penry in deciding Atkins v. Virginia on June
20, 2002.136
III. ATKINS V. VIRGINIA: OVERTURNING THIRTEEN-YEAR-OLD LAW
Around midnight on August 16, 1996, Eric Nesbitt was abducted,
robbed, taken to an automatic teller machine, and forced to withdraw
additional cash. He was then taken to an isolated area where he was shot
eight times and killed.137 Of the two perpetrators of this crime, each said
the other shot Nesbitt, but only one, William Jones, was believed.138 The
other, Daryl Atkins, was mentally retarded.139 During the court
proceedings that followed, Atkins was sentenced to death.140 The
Virginia State Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that his low IQ score was
insufficient grounds to commute his sentence.141
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, and, in a 6-3 decision,
the majority of the Court voted to overturn Penry and declared that
further executions of mentally retarded persons were unconstitutional
because they violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment.142 Though the arguments advanced on either
side of this decision are not much different from those advanced on the
various sides of the cases that went before, the reasoning that prevailed
could predict future rulings of the Court in a potential reexamination of
Stanford as well.

135. This is demonstrated by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, who,
though they candidly admitted that no count of the vote yielded a national consensus, yet opinioned
that it was unconstitutional to execute the mentally retarded. See infra Part II.D.2.a,c-d.
136. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
137. Id. at 307.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 308.
140. Id. at 309. Actually, he was sentenced to death twice—the first jury used a misleading
verdict form. At each hearing, the state psychologist testified that Atkins was not mentally retarded.
See id.
141. See id. at 310.
142. Id. at 306-07, 321.
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A. Atkins’ Majority: No Excessive Punishments
The majority (written by Justice Stevens and joined by Justices
O’Connor, Souter, Ginsberg, Breyer, and Kennedy)143 interpreted the
Eighth Amendment to forbid not just cruel and unusual punishments but
excessive punishments as well.144 Examining state statutes, the opinions
of professional organizations, and finally presenting a proportionality
analysis, the justices in the majority concluded that the evolving
standards of decency, as well as their own considered judgments, forced
the conclusion that the execution of mentally retarded persons was
unconstitutional.145
1. Counting the votes
Paying little attention to the now thirteen states (including the
District of Columbia) that banned the death penalty entirely, the majority
pointed out that twenty-one states (and the federal government) had
passed,146 or had almost passed,147 legislation banning (most with some
qualifications) the execution of mentally retarded persons.148 Assuming
that the final three would eventually finalize their laws, it meant that
twenty-one states out of the thirty-eight (55%) which had a death penalty
banned or would soon ban the execution of the mentally retarded.
Looking nationwide, if the states with no death penalty were included, it
would mean that 66% of all states would not execute the mentally
retarded.
Despite these numbers, however, the majority was quick to point out
“[i]t is not so much the number of these States that is significant, but the
consistency of the direction of change” that is telling of a national
standard.149 Interpreting this direction of change to mean that American
society had now determined that mentally retarded persons are
“categorically less culpable than the average criminal,” the majority also
pointed out that of the legislatures which had considered the question, all
143. Id. at 306. Justices Souter, Thomas, Ginsberg, and Breyer are all new to the Court, but
they replace in equal proportion members of the plurality and dissent on each of the last three cases
discussed above.
144. Id at 311.
145. See generally id. at 306-321.
146. Including Kentucky(1), Tennessee(2), Georgia(3), Maryland(4), New Mexico(5),
Arkansas(6), Colorado(7), Washington(8), Indiana(9), Kansas(10), New York(11), Nebraska(12),
South Dakota(13), Arizona(14), Connecticut(15), Florida(16), Missouri(17), and North Carolina(18).
Id. at 314-15.
147. “The Texas Legislature unanimously adopted a similar bill, and bills have passed at least
one house in . . . Virginia and Nevada.” Id. at 315.
148. See id. at 314-15.
149. Id. at 315.
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had voted in favor of the prohibition.150 Further, the Court looked to the
infrequency of the execution of the mentally retarded even in states that
allow it, citing only five executed prisoners with a known IQ of less than
seventy in the thirteen years since Penry.151 With this evidence, the
majority had no problem finding a national consensus that the execution
of mentally retarded persons was cruel and unusual.
2. Proportionality
The majority continued from vote counting to an examination of
proportionality, indicating its further support of the idea that numbers are
not all that is important. In considering whether the execution of the
mentally retarded serves either of the penological purposes of retribution
or deterrence, the Court looked at the laws of other nations, the opinions
of professional and religious organizations, opinion polls, and their own
judgment.152 The majority’s conclusion, based mainly on professional
definitions of mental retardation,153 is that, because of their impairments,
mentally retarded persons’ culpability for their actions is diminished.154
Having found a lower culpability, the majority next found that such
diminished culpability negates the states’ interest in retribution.155
Pointing out that even the average murderer is insufficiently culpable to
justify execution without aggravating factors, the majority maintained
that “the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded offender surely does
not merit that form of retribution.”156 Deterrence, “predicated upon the
notion that the increased severity of the punishment will inhibit criminal
actors from carrying out murderous conduct,”157 was also reasoned to be
a useless goal when dealing with the mentally retarded because their
lower functioning skills “make it less likely that they can process the
150. Id. at 315-16.
151. Id. at 316.
152. See id. at 316 n.21 (“Although these factors are by no means dispositive, their
consistency with the legislative evidence lends further support to our conclusion that there is a
consensus among those who have addressed the issue.”); see also id. at 313 (“[I]n cases involving a
consensus, our own judgment is ‘brought to bear,’ by asking whether there is reason to disagree with
the judgment reached by the citizenry and its legislators.” (citation omitted)).
153. Id. at 309 n.3 (“The American Association of Mental Retardation (AAMR) defines
mental retardation as follows: ‘Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in present
functioning. It is characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, existing
concurrently with related limitations in two or more of the following applicable adaptive skill areas:
communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community use, self-direction, health and
safety, functional academics, leisure, and work. Mental retardation manifests before age 18.’”
(quoting Mental Retardation: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Supports 5 (9th ed.1992))).
154. Id. at 318.
155. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at. 319.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 320.
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information of the possibility of execution as a penalty and, as a result,
control their conduct based upon that information.”158
The majority also justified a rule against executing the mentally
retarded based on the idea that they are disadvantaged at trial because of
their mental impairments.159 Citing false confessions, a lowered ability to
make a persuasive showing of mitigating factors, the possibility that they
may be less able to assist their counsel at trial, the fact that they are
generally poor witnesses, and a demeanor that may create the impression
of a lack of remorse, the majority concluded that mentally retarded
defendants face a special risk of wrongful execution—especially when
the jury decides that their retardation creates a greater risk of “future
dangerousness.”160
In summary, the majority voted to ban the execution of the mentally
retarded not only because of the number of state legislatures that had
already done so, but also because, in their estimation, the culpability of
the mentally retarded offender does not reach the level of the normal
adult murderer. Acknowledging, however, that there was no consensus
on what the definition of “mentally retarded” is, the justices left that
question for the states to determine. The ruling of the Court merely
forbids the states from executing anyone who falls within their own
definition.161
B. Atkins’ Dissent
Of the three Justices in the dissent (Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia and Thomas), two wrote separate opinions which were
joined by all three. They are discussed together because, though they
emphasize different things, their theme is the same (and familiar): the
majority counted the votes wrong and state legislatures are the only
reliable source of information on the issue.
1. Counting the votes
Justice Scalia’s dissent was quick to point out that eighteen states,
not twenty-one (the majority’s count), had statutes in effect that banned
the execution of the mentally retarded, a total of only 47% of all death
penalty states.162 He next pointed out that only seven of those states
(18%) banned the execution of mentally retarded persons to the extent

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id. at 320-21.
Id.
Id. at 317.
Id. at 342.

WEEKS - MACRO FINAL

474

4/30/2003 5:40 PM

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume XVII

imposed by the majority—since eleven of the eighteen included some
sort of qualification on the injunction.163 Even more, Justice Scalia
criticized the Court for its disregard of the fact “that the legislation of all
18 States it relies on is still in its infancy,” since the oldest was only
fourteen years old.164 To the majority’s contention that it was the
direction of the change that was more telling, Justice Scalia noted that up
until fourteen years ago no state had a statute banning the execution of
the mentally retarded.165 Thus, there was only one direction state
legislation could have changed.166 Chief Justice Rehnquist agreed, calling
the majority’s decision “a post hoc rationalization for the majority’s
subjectively preferred result rather than any objective effort to ascertain
the content of an evolving standard of decency.”167
2. Forbidding proportionality tests and other sources
The Chief Justice and Justice Scalia chaffed at any mention that
sources other than state legislative decisions could be relevant to the
question. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote separately “to call attention to
the defects in the Court’s decision to place weight on foreign laws, the
views of professional and religious organizations, and opinion polls in
reaching its conclusion.”168 Calling the legislatures more suited than the
courts at deciding the moral considerations of the people, he likewise
attacked the use of opinion polls, religious organizations, and the rest as
things that “the elected representatives of a State’s populace have not
deemed . . . persuasive enough to prompt legislative action.”169 Justice
Scalia gave this same analysis “the Prize for the Court’s Most Feeble
Effort to fabricate ‘national consensus.’”170
Attacking the use of proportionality, the dissenting justices generally
objected that the Court should not substitute its own judgment for that of
the American people’s legislative enactments.171 Calling such
substitution “arrogance,”172 Justice Scalia also maintained that the Eighth
Amendment did not forbid excessive punishments and upheld the idea
163. Id.
164. Id. at 344.
165. Id. at 344-45.
166. Id. at 345 (“[T]o be accurate the Court’s ‘consistency-of-the-direction-of-change’ point
should be recast into the following unimpressive observation: ‘No State has yet undone its
exemption of the mentally retarded, one for as long as 14 whole years.’”).
167. Id. at 322.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 326.
170. Id. at 347.
171. See id. at 341, 348.
172. Id. at 348.
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that it is the role of sentencing juries, not the courts, to determine the
appropriate punishment for a certain defendant.173
Some of Justice Scalia’s most persuasive arguments, however, come
in his attack on the majority’s assessment of deterrence. He criticized the
majority’s idea that when a law does not work for everyone, it should not
apply to anyone: “[S]urely, the deterrent effect of a penalty is adequately
vindicated if it successfully deters many, but not all, of the target class.
Virginia’s death penalty, for example, does not fail of its deterrent effect
simply because some criminals are unaware that Virginia has the death
penalty.”174 Rather, he argued, the fact that a defendant is mentally
retarded should be taken by the jury and considered as a mitigating factor
in its decision on whether to impose the death penalty.175 Instead of
focusing on the culpability of the defendant, he defended the jury’s right
to impose severe retribution upon anyone guilty of an especially
depraved crime, so long as juries are given the opportunity to consider a
defendant’s retardation as a mitigating factor.176
The Atkins Court, though thirteen years wiser, still could not escape
the inevitable questions of legislative votes and proportionality. The
question that comes next is this: now that Penry has been overturned, is
Stanford next?
IV. POST-ATKINS APPLICATIONS
As surprising as the decision in Atkins was, its possible applications
have raised hopes and eyebrows in the months since its announcement.
Defendants have already brought cases to the Supreme Court seeking
habeas corpus relief in light of Atkins, and potential applications suggest
themselves by the score.
A. Patterson v. Texas, In re Stanford, and Hain v. Mullin: Seeking to
Apply Atkins to Juveniles
One month after Atkins was released, Toronto Patterson, a death row
inmate convicted of a crime he committed when he was seventeen,177
applied for habeas corpus relief to the Supreme Court.178 Though a
173. See id. at 349.
174. Id. at 351.
175. Id. at 352.
176. Id.
177. The story goes that he killed his cousin and her two young daughters, ages three and six,
as part of a plot to steal some expensive hubcaps from their garage. He was only prosecuted for the
murder of the three-year-old because her murder was the only one that made him death-eligible. See
Toronto Markkey Patterson, U.S. Executions Since 1976, Clark County Indiana Prosecutor, at
http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/death/US/patterson795.htm.
178. Patterson v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 24 (2002).

WEEKS - MACRO FINAL

476

4/30/2003 5:40 PM

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume XVII

majority of the Court denied his petition without comment,179 Justices
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer all dissented in a more lengthy fashion.
Justice Stevens, quoting from Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion in
Stanford v. Kentucky,180 pointed out that “[s]ince that opinion was
written, the issue has been the subject of further debate and discussion
both in this country and in other civilized nations.”181 Citing a change in
circumstances, he asserted that it would be appropriate to revisit the
issue.182 Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, specifically urged
that the Court’s decision in Atkins v. Virginia183 made it tenable to urge
reconsideration of Stanford.184
Two months after Patterson, in October 2002, Kevin Stanford
himself petitioned the Court for a writ of habeas corpus.185 In a five to
four decision against granting the petition, the majority of the Court was
again silent as to its reasoning, leaving the four dissenting Justices to
write alone.186 United this time and joined by Justice Souter, the
dissenting justices, through the pen of Justice Stevens, wrote a two and a
half page dissent, consisting mainly of quoted sections of the reasoning
used by Justice Brennan in his original Stanford dissent.187 Justice
Stevens specifically mentioned that the issue of the juvenile death
penalty is now ripe because of the decision in Atkins and because all but
one of the reasons supporting the holding in that case “apply with equal
or greater force to the execution of juvenile offenders.”188 The only
exception, it seems, is in the number of states expressly forbidding the
execution of juvenile offenders (twenty-eight) compared to the number
forbidding the execution of the mentally retarded (thirty).189 However,
since five states had banned the execution of minors since 1989,190 the

179. The Court’s decision came out two hours before his scheduled execution, thus, (assuming
Patterson was executed at the traditional time of just after midnight and the actual decision could not
be published until the next day) his execution date is identical to the date of the Court’s decision:
August 28, 2002. See Toronto Markkey Patterson, supra note 177.
180. 492 U.S. 361, 382-405 (1989)(Brennan, J., dissenting).
181. Patterson, 123 S. Ct. at 24.
182. Id.
183. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
184. Patterson, 123 S. Ct. at 24.
185. See generally In re Stanford, 123 S. Ct. 472 (2002).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. (counting those states which forbid the death penalty entirely, but excluding those
states discounted by the Atkins dissent which had not actually passed their laws yet.)
190. Id. (including Indiana, Montana, New York, Kansas, and (by state supreme court order)
Washington).
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dissenting justices felt that the direction of the change191 minimized the
significance of those two numbers.192
Finally, on January 27, 2003, a third juvenile offender, Scott Allen
Hain,193 petitioned for habeas corpus relief from the Court.194 This time
without a vocal dissent, the Court flatly denied Hain’s petition for writ of
certiorari.195 The day the decision was announced, newspapers and death
penalty abolition advocates recognized a temporary defeat on the issue,
concluding that In re Stanford’s four dissenting Justices had realized they
weren’t going to get the crucial fifth vote they needed to consider a
juvenile death penalty case.196 Though the abolition advocates may be
correct in their prediction of at least a temporary defeat, the issue is far
from ultimately decided. Referring to the direction of change that
brought about the Court’s Atkins decision, one report related that
“[d]eath penalty opponents say they need the same kind of momentum
among state legislatures on the question of young killers, and said the
high court will get involved when more states outlaw the death penalty
for those under 18.”197
B. Current Status of State Statutes on the Execution of Minors
Though the Court might not consider the execution of juveniles until
more state legislatures ban the practice, it is instructive to examine the
current count of the state statutes (or “votes”)198 on the execution of
minors for such a time as it may come up. Attached as Appendix A is a
chart showing where each state falls on the scale. How the Court would
count these votes will depend, of course, on the justice(s) doing the

191. See discussion supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
192. See generally In re Stanford, 123 S. Ct. 472 (2002).
193. Hain was convicted and sentenced to death for a double murder committed when he was
seventeen. See Hain v. Gibson, 287 F.3d 1224 (2002). Together with a friend, he had stolen a car, a
truck, and $565 from a young couple and then burned the car with the couple trapped alive in the
trunk. Id.
194. Hain v. Mullin, 123 S. Ct. 993 (2003).
195. Id. A little over a month later, having exhausted all his appeals, Hain was executed April
3, 2003 by lethal injection. See Scott Allen Hain, U.S. Executions Since 1976, Clark County Indiana
Prosecutor, at http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/death/US/hain843.htm.
196. See generally Linda Greenhouse, Justices Deny Inmate Appeal In Execution Of Juveniles,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2003, at A18 (“The Supreme Court effectively shut the door today on
reconsidering, at least in the foreseeable future, its precedents permitting the death penalty to be
imposed on those who were 16 or 17 when they committed their capital crimes.”).
197. Anne Gearan, Court Refuses Juvenile Death Row Case, Associated Press, Jan. 27, 2003,
at http://quickstart.clari.net/qs_se/webnews/wed/bn/Ascotus-death-penalty.RmP3_DJR.html.
198. Though the Court is technically a non-political body, the reasoning in their decisions
clearly shows that the justices judge the evolving standard of decency (and, hence, the requirements
of the Eighth Amendment) through examination of state statutes—or, by analogy, the state’s “votes”
on the issue.
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counting. However, the basic facts are that, out of fifty-two
jurisdictions,199 thirty (57%) currently make it impossible to execute any
offender younger than eighteen at the time of his/her offense. Twentytwo (42%) either specifically or technically allow executing juvenile
offenders and, of those, only seven (31.8%) have executed any juvenile
offenders since 1976.200
Considering those seven states which set no minimum age, it is
difficult to tell how the different sides would count them since each side
has historically swung back and forth on the subject. Whether they are
included or excluded, only two of those states have actually executed a
juvenile since 1976.201 However, each of them has one or more juveniles
currently on death row—or so few adults on death row that the presence
of just one juvenile would make that state’s percentage skyrocket above
the national average of 2.36%.202
Were the justices of the Stanford plurality to count the votes today,203
they would most likely only count the statutes of the thirty-nine
jurisdictions that technically allow capital punishment. By this count,
they would yield twenty-two jurisdictions (42% of all fifty-two and 56%
of the thirty-nine death penalty states) which allow the execution of
juveniles aged sixteen and seventeen, including only eighteen
jurisdictions (34.6% of all fifty-two and 46% of the thirty-nine death
penalty states) which allow the execution of offenders as young as
sixteen. The justices of Stanford’s dissent would count the votes of all
fifty-two jurisdictions. Their count would identify thirty jurisdictions
(57.7%) which do not execute any juveniles, thirty-four jurisdictions
(65%) which do not execute sixteen-year-old offenders, and may even
count seven more states which have not used their statute since 1976.204
Including those seven would yield a grand total of thirty-seven
jurisdictions (71%) which do not execute juveniles and forty-one
jurisdictions (79%) which do not execute sixteen-year-olds.
Of course, the numbers mentioned above will not be accurate for
long. Even now, ten states are considering a possible ban on the
199. This number includes the Federal Government and the District of Columbia but excludes
the Military.
200. It is interesting to note that, of those executed, Texas, which only executes ages
seventeen and up, is responsible for thirteen (62%) of them. See infra Appendixes A-B.
201. Louisiana and South Carolina. See id.
202. See id.
203. This assumes the justices might count the votes from each of the fifty-two jurisdictions
mentioned above and included in the chart in Appendix A.
204. New Hampshire does not use their capital punishment statute at all. See Appendix B.
Arkansas, Delaware, Wyoming, Idaho, South Dakota, and Utah have not executed any juvenile
offenders since 1976, and none of these states has any juvenile offenders currently on death row.
See id.
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execution of juvenile offenders.205 Though it is unlikely that all ten will
decide to enact such a ban,206 if even two states do so, the numbers of
states banning the execution of juvenile offenders would then match the
number of states (thirty) banning mentally retarded executions prior to
the Court’s decision in Atkins.207 With at least three of those states
considering such legislation during the 2003 legislative season,208
Stanford could soon be ripe for reconsideration.
C. Ramifications of Overturning Stanford
1. The “low culpability defense”
Were Stanford to be overturned, it is naive to think that it would stop
there. Once mentally retarded persons are excluded for low IQ’s and
juveniles are excluded for their sub-average mental and social skills, it is
easy to predict that many defendants will emerge from the new loopholes
of the criminal justice system claiming “low culpability.” Middle-aged
adults, for instance, who never grew up or who fried their brains as
children, will also want to claim that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
their execution. Every adult in America knows that there are adults
among us who will lose a contest of wits to a bright fifteen-year-old
every time. Would it be fair to impose the death sentence upon these
adults when we absolutely refrain from imposing it upon the bright
fifteen-year-old?
2. Mandatory culpability analysis
Juries may be one day required to consider not only the heinousness
of the crime and the mitigating factors presented by the defendant, but
also whether or not the defendant is culpable at the “normal” adult level.
This possibility naturally raises difficult questions of definition. (What is
the “normal” adult level of culpability? How do we measure it?) One
question that must also be raised, however, is why not require that a jury
perform a culpability analysis for every defendant? Were juveniles
presumed to be less culpable until a jury is able to find them to be one of
the bright ones, it would relieve the biggest problems of both sides of the

205. Including Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nevada, South Carolina, and Texas. Overview of the Death Penalty Today, American Bar
Association, at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/resources.html
206. In Arkansas, Florida, and Texas, similar legislation has already been attempted, but only
passed in one house. It is being reintroduced this year. Id.
207. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 206.
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argument. Justice Scalia could rest easy knowing that the really culpable
juveniles were being punished as they deserved, and Justice Stevens
could sigh with the relief of knowing that the below average juveniles
were being spared. It would not be a perfect solution, for some will
certainly slip through the cracks each way, but it would certainly go a
long way toward alleviating the problem.
For this particular plan to work, however, two things must happen.
First, juveniles must not be excluded from the death penalty. In order to
leave juries with the power to execute the bright ones who truly knew
what they were doing, the Supreme Court cannot ban the whole group
from capital punishment eligibility. However, to counteract the
dangerous possibility that the truly less culpable defendant would be
executed by a jury prejudiced by the horrific nature of his or her crime,
another procedural layer must be added. In order to protect the jury from
such prejudice, there would need to be a requirement that the jury not
consider the heinousness of the crime while considering the culpability
of the defendant. To truly make the punishment fit the crime and the
culpability of the defendant, the defendant’s culpability would not be
simply another mitigating factor, but a way to remove those who are
truly less culpable from the grasp of the death penalty.
3. What if we evolve backwards?
One thing that few of the justices have openly considered is the
possibility that our national morals may change dramatically. What will
happen when, one-hundred years from now, after the death penalty has
been whittled down to a stump, the nation as a whole decides (perhaps in
response to an uncontrollable upswing in simple murder) that they are
more concerned about a victim’s sensibilities than with the culpability of
a violent murderer? Justice Scalia, as part of his attack on the Atkins
plurality’s “consistency of the direction of change” analysis, urged that
“reliance upon ‘trends,’ even those of much longer duration than a mere
14 years, is a perilous basis for constitutional adjudication.”209
Thereafter, he quoted a section of Justice O’Connor’s Thompson dissent,
which, as Justice Scalia said, “eloquently explain[s]” the problem:210
In 1846, Michigan became the first State to abolish the death
penalty . . . . In succeeding decades, other American States continued
the trend towards abolition . . . . Later, and particularly after World War
II, there ensued a steady and dramatic decline in executions . . . . In the
1950’s and 1960’s, more States abolished or radically restricted capital

209. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 345 (2002)(Scalia, J. dissenting).
210. Id.

WEEKS - MACRO FINAL

451]

4/30/2003 5:40 PM

DEATH PENALTY

481

punishment, and executions ceased completely for several years
beginning in 1968 . . . . In 1972, when this Court heard arguments on
the constitutionality of the death penalty, such statistics might have
suggested that the practice had become a relic, implicitly rejected by a
new societal consensus . . . . We now know that any inference of a
societal consensus rejecting the death penalty would have been
mistaken. But had this Court then declared the existence of such a
consensus, and outlawed capital punishment, legislatures would very
likely not have been able to revive it. The mistaken premise of the
decision would have been frozen into constitutional law, making it
211
difficult to refute and even more difficult to reject.

The main problem seems to be that traditional analysis of the evolving
standards of decency does not leave room for regression.
V. CONCLUSION
Since 1976, we have seen many changes in death penalty
jurisprudence. One group after another has been gradually eliminated
from the arena of the death penalty—first for the type of crime or
because of complete incompetence, then because certain justices
believed that group to be less culpable than the rest. In the end, in order
to predict the outcome of any given issue—such as the future of the
juvenile death penalty—we must be able to make accurate guesses on a
few different factors. We must be aware that Justice O’Connor is swayed
by the dual prongs of proportionality and state statutes (assuming that
she will remain on the Court long enough to vote on this issue again).
Though it is difficult to tell the weight she gives to each, the best guess
would assume that a bare majority of state statutes will enable her to vote
on the side of excluding juvenile offenders so long as the inevitable
amici have been able to persuade her that juveniles are truly less culpable
than their adult counterparts. The rest of the Court, with the possible
exception of Justice Kennedy, is easier to predict. Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer have already demonstrated that
proportionality reigns supreme in their camp. They will likely ban the
execution of juvenile offenders as soon as they can compile enough
Supreme Court votes to do so, regardless of which way the state statutes
fall. On the opposite side of the line, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia and Thomas, who ignore proportionality completely, will most
likely need to see a great majority of state statutes banning the execution
of juvenile offenders before they will conclude that a conclusive national
consensus exists.

211. Id. See also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 854-855 (1988).
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In the end, one cannot help but be torn by the controversy that has
divided the highest Court for years. Few Americans doubt that some
crimes—or at least some defendants—deserve death no matter what their
age. This is one reason why seventeen-year-old John Lee Malvo, of
Washington, D.C. sniper fame, is being tried first in Virginia—where he
can still be executed—instead of Maryland, where most of the shootings
took place.212 Still, however, one has to wonder whether defendants as
young as Malvo, who psychologists tell us do not yet function at the
adult level of culpability, truly deserve to die for what might have been
simply a youthful—if egregious—mistake in judgment.
Robin M. A. Weeks

212. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Deny Inmate Appeal In Execution Of Juveniles, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 28, 2003, at A18 (“Mr. Malvo is being tried in Virginia, after a public search by the Bush
administration for a jurisdiction where he could be executed. Maryland, where the greatest number
of the sniper killings took place, bars the execution of those younger than 18.”).
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Appendix A213
AGE OF DEATH PENALTY ELIGIBILITY BY JURISDICTION
No Death Penalty

18 and Over

17

16

No Minimum Age

25%

33%

8%

21%

Specified 13.5%

1.

Alaska

California

Georgia (1)

Alabama‡

Arizona‡

2.

Washington, D.C.

Colorado

New Hampshire†

Arkansas‡

Idaho

3.

Hawaii

Connecticut

North Carolina

Delaware

Louisiana (1)

4.

Iowa

Illinois *

Texas (13)‡

Florida‡

Pennsylvania

5.

Maine

Indiana *

Kentucky‡

South Carolina (1)‡

6.

Massachusetts

Kansas *

Mississippi‡

South Dakota

7.

Michigan

Maryland

Missouri (1)‡

Utah

8.

Minnesota

Montana (1)*

Nevada‡

9.

North Dakota

Nebraska

Oklahoma (2)

10.

Rhode Island

New Jersey

Virginia (3)

11.

Vermont

New Mexico

Wyoming

12.

West Virginia

New York*

13.

Wisconsin

Ohio

14.

Oregon

15.

Tennessee

16.

Washington*

17.

Federal Gov.*
( ) Parentheses indicate numbers of juvenile offenders executed in each state between 1976
and April 2003.
* Indicates a jurisdiction that has moved to the “18 and over” category since 1989 (Seven
total).
† Indicates a jurisdiction that has moved from the “18 and over” category since 1989 (One
total).
‡ Indicates a jurisdiction considering legislation banning the execution of juvenile offenders
(Ten total).
213. See U.S. Executions Since 1976, Clark County Indiana Prosecutor, at
http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/death/usexecute.htm; The Death Penalty in the U.S. Clark
County Indiana Prosecutor, at http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/death/dpusa.htm; Death Row
U.S.A. Winter 2003, Death Penalty Information Center at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
DEATHROWUSArecent.pdf; Execution of Juvenile Offenders, Amnesty International, at
http://www.icomm.ca/aiusa/abolish/juvexec.html (last visited October 2002); Capital Punishment
Statistics,
U.S.
Department
of
Justice
Bureau
of
Justice
Statistics
at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/cp.htm; Overview of the Death Penalty Today, American Bar
Association, available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/resources.html; Factsheet: The
Juvenile Death Penalty, American Bar Association, available at http://www.abanet.org/
crimjust/juvjus/resources.html; Death Row Inmates by State, Death Penalty Information Center, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/DRowInfo.html#state; see also Capital Punishment Timeline, Clark
County Indiana Prosecutor, at http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/death/timeline.htm. Each of
these sites contain general information, charts, lists, etc, about the death penalty as it relates to
juveniles or others that was used to compile the information in Appendices A and B.
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Appendix B214
JUVENILES ON DEATH ROW BY STATE INCLUDING STATISTICS OF
EXECUTED JUVENILES IN EACH STATE AS OF JANUARY 2003
Total Juveniles on Death Row out of Total Death Row Inmates: 83 /
3,516 (2.36%)
• Death Row Juvenile Offenders in States that execute 17 and over:
Georgia: 2 out of 118 (1.7%)
Executed 1 juvenile offender since 1976
New Hampshire: 0 out of 0 total
North Carolina: 5 out of 217 (2.3%)
Texas: 28 out of 454 (6.16%)
Executed 13 juvenile offenders since 1976
Executed Toronto Markkey Patterson on August 28, 2002
• Death Row Juvenile Offenders in States that execute 16 and over:
Alabama: 13 out of 194 (6.7%)
Arkansas: 0 out of 42
Just one juvenile offender would be 2.4%
Delaware: 0 out of 19
Just one juvenile offender would be 5.26%
Florida: 2 out of 382 (.5%)
Kentucky: 1 out of 39 (2.56%)
Mississippi: 6 out of 69 (8.7%)
Missouri: 2 out of 70 (2.85%)
Executed 1 juvenile offender since 1976
Nevada: 1 out of 86 (1.16%)
Oklahoma: 1 out of 116215
Executed 2 juvenile offenders since 1976 (including Hain)
Executed Scott Allen Hain on April 9, 2003
Virginia: 1 out of 25 (4%)
Executed 3 juvenile offenders since 1976
Wyoming: 0 out of 2
Just one juvenile offender would be 50%
• Death Row Juvenile Offenders in Unspecified Age States:
Arizona: 5 out of 122 total (4.1%)
Idaho: 0 out of 22 total
Just one juvenile offender would be 4.5%
214. See generally cites contained in supra note 213.
215. Though it is noted that Oklahoma has executed a juvenile (Hain) since January, 2003,
numbers remain unaltered so that they may be counted from the same point as the rest of the states.
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Louisiana: 7 out of 97 total (7.2%)
Executed 1 juvenile offender since 1976
Pennsylvania: 4 out of 244 total (1.6%)
South Carolina: 3 out of 77 total (9%)
Executed 1 juvenile offender since 1976
South Dakota: 0 out of 5 total
Just one juvenile offender would be 20%
Each of the 5 total have been sentenced since 1989
(Stanford dissent pointed out that SD had not sentenced
anyone to death since Furman)
Utah: 0 out of 11 total
Just one juvenile offender would be 9%

